Not Approved for Human Consumption: A Study of the Denmark Water Crisis, a Call for Reforming the SWDA, and a Demand for Community Lawyering in Rural America by Woodward, Matthew
William & Mary Environmental Law and Policy Review 
Volume Volume 45 (2020-2021) 




Not Approved for Human Consumption: A Study of the Denmark 
Water Crisis, a Call for Reforming the SWDA, and a Demand for 
Community Lawyering in Rural America 
Matthew Woodward 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmelpr 
 Part of the Environmental Law Commons, and the Water Resource Management Commons 
Repository Citation 
Matthew Woodward, Not Approved for Human Consumption: A Study of the Denmark Water 
Crisis, a Call for Reforming the SWDA, and a Demand for Community Lawyering in Rural 
America, 45 Wm. & Mary Envtl. L. & Pol'y Rev. 881 (2021), https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/
wmelpr/vol45/iss3/9 
Copyright c 2021 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship 
Repository. 
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmelpr 
NOT APPROVED FOR HUMAN CONSUMPTION:
A STUDY OF THE DENMARK WATER CRISIS, A CALL
FOR REFORMING THE SDWA, AND A DEMAND FOR
COMMUNITY LAWYERING IN RURAL AMERICA
MATTHEW WOODWARD*
INTRODUCTION
Over the past four decades, nine million Americans have ingested
dangerous drinking water from a trusted source: their own taps.1 Each
year, “an estimated 16.4 million cases of acute gastroenteritis” are linked
to public drinking water.2 For many Americans, drinking water—perhaps
the most important cornerstone of human health—has become cause for
concern.
In Flint, Michigan, this concern turned to panic. In 2014, after tod-
dlers began developing painful skin conditions, children fell seriously ill,
and tap water emerged in the form of thick, orange-brown sludge, the peo-
ple of Flint began to wonder: is there something in the water?3 What soon
became known as the Flint Water Crisis drew new attention to the pitfalls
of water system mismanagement.4 More recently, Newark, New Jersey, has
endured its own water crisis, with levels of lead in the city’s drinking water
among “the highest recently recorded by a large water system in the United
States.”5 As in Flint, the response of Newark city authorities has only
* JD Candidate, William & Mary Law School, 2021; BA English, BS Sociology, College of
Charleston, 2017. The author would like to thank the ELPR staff for their diligent efforts
preparing this Note for publication.
1 Maura Allaire et al., National Trends in Drinking Water Quality Violations, 115 PROC.
NAT’L. ACAD. SCI. 2078, 2078 (2018).
2 Id.
3 Brie D. Sherwin, Pride and Prejudice and Administrative Zombies: How Economic Woes,
Outdated Environmental Regulations, and State Exceptionalism Failed Flint, Michigan,
88 U. COLO. L. REV. 653, 657 (2017).
4 Zainab Sultan, Newark, ‘The Next Flint,’ and Water-Crisis Coverage, COLUM.JOURNALISM
REV.(Sept. 12, 2019), https://www.cjr.org/united_states_project/newark-flint-water-lead
.php [https://perma.cc/LBH9-ZKR2].
5 Newark Drinking Water Crisis, NAT’LRES.DEF.COUNCIL, https://www.nrdc.org/newark
-drinking-water-crisis [https://perma.cc/7M8N-KKGS] (last visited Mar. 10, 2021).
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compounded the problem, with some residents drinking the tainted water
for twenty-one months before receiving a water filter.6
Water issues in places like Flint and Newark have drawn deserved
media attention and sparked a discussion of health, equity, and access
in America’s cities.7 Missing from this discussion about America’s water
management, however, are the nearly twenty percent of Americans that
live in rural areas.8 In real numbers, this translates to roughly 60 million
people who, like most other Americans, depend on public water supplies
for survival.9
While Flint, Newark, and other big-city water crises may have justi-
fiably increased awareness,10 the reality is stark: drinking water problems
disproportionately affect rural areas over urban or suburban areas.11
Furthermore, research shows that within these disproportionately affected
rural areas, it is specifically low-income communities which suffer from the
greatest risk of ingesting unsafe water.12 The designation of “low-income,
rural area” includes millions of people, making the problem of clean drink-
ing water in these areas a profoundly impactful one.
Through an analysis of ongoing drinking water issues in the rural
community of Denmark, South Carolina, this Note presents a discussion
of the hurdles America’s low-income, rural communities face in the fight
for clean drinking water. Part I of this Note places Denmark and its water
issues in context. Part II provides an overview of specifically low-income,
rural challenges, arguing that a combination of ineffective enforcement
under the Safe Drinking Water Act (“SDWA”) and inadequate responses
to water issues have resulted in a uniquely rural water crisis nationwide.
Part III documents these structural causes and responses to the water
crisis in Denmark. Finally, Part IV advocates reforms to the SDWA and a
6 Courtney Lindwall, Inside the Fight for Clean Water in Newark, NAT’L.RES.DEF.COUNCIL
(May 21, 2019), https://www.nrdc.org/stories/inside-fight-clean-water-newark [https://perma
.cc/5PJX-JDSW].
7 See, e.g., Sherwin, supra note 3, at 656.
8 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, MEASURING AMERICA: OUR CHANGING LANDSCAPE (2016), https://
www.census.gov/library/visualizations/2016/comm/acs-rural-urban.html [https://perma
.cc/F2AA-DASM].
9 Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, New Census Data Show Differences Between
Urban and Rural Populations (Dec. 8, 2016), https://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-re
leases/2016/cb16-210.html [https://perma.cc/7SQN-EF29].
10 Debi Ores, Thirsty for Justice: The Fight for Safe Drinking Water, 25 HASTINGS ENV’T
L.J. 101, 101 (2019).
11 Allaire et al., supra note 1, at Fig. 3.
12 Id. at 2080.
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strategy of community inclusion to secure clean water in Denmark and
across rural America.
I. DENMARK, SOUTH CAROLINA: CONTEXT AND THE BEGINNINGS OF
A CRISIS
A. Denmark: A Rural Community in Distress
Denmark, South Carolina, is a city of approximately 3,100 people
located within Bamberg County.13 Denmark’s population is majority-
minority, with more than eighty percent of the city’s residents identifying
as Black or African American.14 Roughly fifty miles from Columbia and
one hundred miles from Charleston15—two of the state’s main population
centers—Denmark is isolated. Historically a trading and market center, the
city’s “progress [has] ebbed and flowed with the rural agricultural economy”
since its founding.16
As this history suggests, economic insecurity remains an unfortu-
nate reality for present-day Denmark and Bamberg County. As detailed in
a 2019 State of South Carolina report, in 2018 Bamberg County endured
an unemployment rate of 6.5%, nearly double the state rate of around
3.5%.17 Similarly, the poverty rate within Denmark is an alarming 35%,18
considerably higher than the already high South Carolina–wide figure
of 15.4%.19 Within Denmark, the median household income is $25,250,20
notably below the federal poverty threshold of $26,200 for a family of
13 Denmark City, South Carolina, U.S.CENSUSBUREAU, https://data.census.gov/cedsci/pro
file?q=Denmark%20city,%20South%20Carolina&g=1600000US4519105 [https://perma.cc
/SLM5-PFTH] (last visited Mar. 10, 2021).
14 Id.
15 Approximate Distance from Denmark, SC to Columbia, SC. GOOGLEMAPS, http://maps
.google.com [https://perma.cc/VCU9-6Y8B] (follow “Directions” hyperlink; then search
starting point field for “Denmark, SC” and search destination field for “Columbia, SC”);
Approximate Distance from Denmark, SC to Charleston, SC. GOOGLE MAPS, http://maps
.google.com [https://perma.cc/VCU9-6Y8B] (follow “Directions” hyperlink; then search
starting point field for “Denmark, SC” and search destination field for “Charleston, SC”).
16 Robert A. Pierce, Denmark, S.C.ENCYCLOPEDIA (May 17, 2016), http://www.scencyclope
dia.org/sce/entries/denmark [https://perma.cc/7Q5Z-UPAV].
17 CMTY PROFILE: BAMBERG CNTY., BUS. INTEL. DEP’T, S.C. DEP’T OF EMP. & WORKFORCE,
1(2019),https://lmi.dew.sc.gov/lmi%20site/Documents/CommunityProfiles/04000009.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WK5W-7FGK].
18 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 13.
19 South Carolina: 2018, TALK POVERTY, https://talkpoverty.org/state-year-report/south
-carolina-2018-report/ [https://perma.cc/MCL6-TKPQ] (last visited Mar. 10, 2021).
20 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 13.
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four.21 More than just shocking numbers, this dire economic situation has
far-reaching effects—as levels of concentrated poverty “contribut[e] to poor
housing and health conditions, higher crime and school dropout rates,
and employment dislocations.”22 In short, the prevalence of poverty in a
place like Denmark creates a web of challenges that go far beyond “indi-
vidual circumstances.”23
B. Denmark’s Drinking Water—A Problem Long in the Making
The South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental
Control (“DHEC”) defines Denmark’s water system as “a small rural water
system.”24 Like many such systems within the state, Denmark receives
its water from wells, which in turn draw groundwater from an aquifer
located nearly 300 feet below ground.25 Before August of 2018, Denmark
was served by four individual wells.26 In August of 2018, one of these wells,
referred to as the Cox Mill well, was taken out of service,27 leaving the
city with three functioning water sources.
While the removal of the Cox Mill well from the city’s system has
come to represent the Denmark Water Crisis, problems began with years
of customer complaints and state reprimands for repeated violations. For
nearly a decade, Denmark residents “have been suspicious of the rust-
colored water” which came from their taps.28 Residents repeatedly con-
tacted city administrators and water system administrators but were
repeatedly told by both Denmark and South Carolina officials that the
water was safe to consume.29
21 2020 Poverty Guidelines, OFF. OF THE ASSISTANT SEC’Y FOR PLAN. & EVALUATION, U.S.
DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, https://aspe.hhs.gov/2020-poverty-guidelines
[https://perma.cc/22KL-UVF8] (last visited Mar. 10, 2021).
22 Rural Poverty & Well-Being, ECON. RSCH. SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., https://www.ers
.usda.gov/topics/rural-economy-population/rural-poverty-well-being/ [https://perma.cc
/R69E-TR9P] (last updated Aug. 20, 2019).
23 Id.
24 Denmark Public Water System, S.C.DEP’T OF HEALTH &ENV’T CONTROL, https://scdhec
.gov/environment/your-water-coast/denmark-public-water-system [https://perma.cc/L7XA




28 Sara Ganim, For 10 Years, A Chemical Not EPA Approved Was in Their Drinking Water,
CNN (Nov. 28, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/11/11/health/denmark-sc-water-chemi
cal-not-epa-approved/index.html [https://perma.cc/U9WP-MPWT].
29 Id.
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Behind these assurances, however, City and State officials were
aware as early as 2010 that the City’s water system was rife with problems.
Based on findings from two annual monitoring surveys conducted by DHEC
in 2009, Denmark was issued a consent order in 2010, documenting both
the numerous violations observed during the surveys and a high volume
of customer complaints regarding the city’s water to DHEC.30 As detailed
in the consent order, DHEC inspectors analyzed Denmark’s community
water system (“CWS”) twice over the course of 2009, each time grading
the CWS as “unsatisfactory.”31 Among the eighteen individual violations
noted in both surveys, inspectors repeatedly found that standard water
quality assurance tools such as flushing and leak detection were
unsatisfactory because they simply did not exist: Denmark was operating
its CWS without these safety protocols.32
More than just mere noncompliance and inaction, Denmark CWS
officials also did not have a full handle over the general administration
of the system. The 2009 inspectors pointed to an absence of “adequate
record keeping” and fundamental management deficiencies, such as the
lack of an accurate system map, as justification for the ensuing “unsatis-
factory” rating in both 2009 surveys for “basic operation and control” over
the whole of the CWS.33
These problems persisted into 2011, with Denmark again receiv-
ing an “unsatisfactory” rating for the management of its CWS and “needs
improvement” rating for its overall water quality in an annual survey
from that year.34 In the survey report, DHEC inspectors noted the contin-
uance of “discoloration issues” and significant violations of nearly every
category.35 For example, Denmark’s CWS remained without any semblance
of a flushing program—a basic safety measure described by inspectors as
“vital.”36 While recommending that Denmark immediately adopt “a rigor-
ous . . . system-wide flushing program,” the 2011 survey echoed the one
conducted in 2009, finding that the town had “failed to adequately and con-
sistently address this deficiency”37 despite its inclusion in every annual
survey over the past five years.
30 Id.
31 Consent Order, No, 10-00-DW City of Denmark Public Water System, 2–3 (S.C., Dep’t
Health & Env’t, Jan. 25, 2010).
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 S.C.DEP’T OF HEALTH &ENV’T CONTROL,2011TOWN OF DEN.SANITARY SURVEY 1,3 (2011).
35 Id.
36 Id. at 4.
37 Id.
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The 2011 survey also contained more concerns over administra-
tion, with inspectors noting that the Town of Denmark only employed one
licensed CWS operator and that its staffing rating of “needs improvement”
was chiefly due to the failure “to continuously manage system mainte-
nance in a proactive manner.”38 While the findings of the 2011 report would
eventually create their own controversy, then-state regulators mysteri-
ously removed the 2010 Consent Order in 2013, having hastily concluded
that Denmark had fulfilled its requirements.39
Five years after the removal of the consent order, 2018 brought a
new level of scrutiny to Denmark’s drinking water. While the 2011 survey
alleged an overall reduction in the number of citizen complaints related
to discolored water,40 an ensuing increase in complaints over the follow-
ing seven years and an acrimonious April 2018 community meeting led
DHEC to perform a special sampling study of Denmark’s four wells.41 In
large part, the impetus of this study was community anger related to
rumors of elevated levels of lead, iron, manganese, and copper within the
town’s drinking water supply.42 Ultimately, however, the April 2018 study
simply concluded that there were no “significant issues with the water
quality at any of the public wells serving the City of Denmark.”43
Months later, in August 2018, the veneer of safety in Denmark’s wa-
ter system began to crack. After the 2018 study disclosed that a chemical
known as “HaloSan” was being used in the form of “automatic injection”
tablets at the Cox Mill well,44 watchdog forces in the state took notice. In
August 2018, researchers at Clemson University’s Department of Pesticide
Regulation—which oversees the use of pesticides within the state—ordered
the immediate end to the use of HaloSan as a water additive in Denmark.45
C. What Is HaloSan and Why Did Denmark Use It?
The mandated end of HaloSan use and Denmark’s subsequent clo-
sure of the Cox Mill well began to raise a serious question in Denmark:
38 Id. at 6.
39 Letter from Daniel S. Malonza, Drinking Water Enf. Section, S.C. Dep’t of Health &
Env’t Control, to Dr. Gerald Wright, Mayor of Denmark (Apr. 11, 2013), https://www.scd
hec.gov/sites/default/files/media/document/consent-order-met_2013.05.11.Denmark.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5QLF-33C5].
40 S.C. DEP’T OF HEALTH & ENV’T CONTROL, supra note 34, at 3.
41 BUREAU OF WATER, S.C. DEP’T OF HEALTH &ENV’T CONTROL, STUDY OF WATER QUALITY
OF PUBLIC WELLS SERVING CITY OF DENMARK’S PUBLIC WATER SYSTEM 3 (2018).
42 Id. at 5.
43 Id. at 13.
44 Id. at 7.
45 Ganim, supra note 28.
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What exactly is HaloSan?46 HaloSan is a commercial brand name for a
class of chemicals known as Halohydanatoins.47 As detailed in a 2007 U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) risk assessment report, these
chemicals are volatile skin and eye irritants, can cause severe internal
bleeding, and are highly toxic when inhaled.48 According to the EPA, Halo-
hydanatoins are effective in an array of industrial uses such as toilet bowl
cleaning products, photo processing agents, and pulp paper mill systems
so long as the proper safety protocols are implemented.49 However, none of
the suggested uses for these chemicals involves ingestion by human beings.
Accordingly, the 2007 EPA report officially classified Halohydanatoins—
the active chemical in HaloSan—as a pesticide.50 Because of this classifi-
cation and widespread use as an industrial chemical, HaloSan has never
even been tested as a drinking water additive and therefore carries no
EPA approval for such application.51
The extreme toxicity of HaloSan, its health risks, and its subsequent
lack of EPA approval for applications within drinking water systems,52
makes its use in Denmark’s CWS profoundly troubling. Incredibly, despite
the well-documented risks of HaloSan within a then four-year-old official
EPA report,53 the 2011 survey of Denmark’s CWS acknowledges the use
of HaloSan without calling for its removal from the system. Instead, 2011
inspectors document other problems within the CWS54 and mention only
that staff tasked with administering HaloSan to the Cox Mill well are “un-
familiar with [its] function” and that the information related to the well’s
self-check “is not documented.”55 Glaringly, this 2011 report—published
seven years before the forced closure of the Cox Mill well—also vaguely
points out the availability of an unnamed, indeterminate “HaloSan residual
test kit” but notes that it “is not utilized by [Denmark’s] system.”56 Thus,
according to the 2011 report, not only were Denmark CWS administrators
46 S.C. DEP’T OF HEALTH & ENV’T CONTROL, supra note 34.
47 EPA,REGISTRATION ELIGIBILITYDECISION FOR HALOHYDANATOINS (CASE3055)1(2007).
48 Id. at 13.
49 Id. at 7–8.
50 Letter from Frank T. Sanders to Registrant (Sept. 2007), in EPA, REGISTRATION ELIGI-
BILITY DECISION FOR HALOHYDANATOINS (2007).
51 Ganim, supra note 28.
52 See EPA, supra note 47, at 13.
53 Id.
54 See infra Section I.A; S.C. DEP’T OF HEALTH & ENV’T CONTROL, supra note 34, at 6
(calling the 2011 violations “significant” in nature and referring Denmark’s CWS to DHEC’s
Drinking Water Enforcement section).
55 S.C. DEP’T OF HEALTH & ENV’T CONTROL, supra note 34, at 2.
56 Id. (not identifying or further discussing the HaloSan testing kit described in the report).
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putting an industrial pesticide not approved for human consumption into
the CWS, administrators were also not providing adequate training or ap-
plication procedures to mitigate its well-documented, serious health risks.
In 2018, as Denmark’s use of HaloSan began to gain minor media
attention, state regulators and Denmark city officials began offering mys-
teriously vague justifications for its use. A South Carolina DHEC spokes-
person insisted without evidence that HaloSan had “been advertised as
an effective treatment.”57 Echoing this rationale, Denmark Mayor, Gerald
Wright, claimed that “it was our thinking that it was an approved chemi-
cal.”58 Further, Mayor Wright seemed to ignore Denmark’s role as an
administrator of its own CWS and to deflect any responsibility for HaloSan
use—saying only that Denmark “rel[ies] totally on DHEC . . . they have the
responsibility and expertise.”59 Apart from highlighting the disastrous
levels of ignorance behind Denmark’s introduction of an EPA-classified
pesticide60 to an already imperiled water system, these statements reveal
a more pressing danger for rural CWSs and the communities that rely on
them: a blinding degree of regulatory confusion.
II. A UNIQUELY RURAL PROBLEM
A. Drinking Water Barriers in Rural Communities
Denmark’s failure to maintain its water system is not unique among
other low-income rural areas. Specifically, Mayor Wright’s evasive sugges-
tion that a South Carolina state agency, DHEC, retains legal responsibil-
ity over Denmark’s CWS and its use of HaloSan simply because they have
the “expertise”61 exemplifies a troubling broader trend: rural places are
fumbling when it comes to regulations on drinking water and environ-
mental practices.
Low-income, rural communities face a threshold hurdle to drink-
ing water compliance: money.62 “[L]imited financial resources” has been
highlighted as a major cause of the serious compliance issues found in
many rural CWSs.63 These places, like Denmark, suffer from a range of
economic woes that directly impact their ability to effectively manage a
57 Ganim, supra note 28.
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 EPA, supra note 47, at 13.
61 Ganim, supra note 28.
62 Allaire et al., supra note 1, at 2082.
63 Id.
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CWS. With low tax revenues and a lack of access to infrastructure loans
due to lower credit scores, America’s “Denmarks” are broadly struggling
to provide basic services, including maintaining and overseeing their
CWS infrastructure.64
Compounding these concerns and the focus of this Note is the maze
of regulatory and enforcement responsibility for low-income, rural commu-
nities. In effect, the distressed financial situation of places like Denmark
means that CWS officials and administrators face three connected hurdles
in meeting the standards of the SDWA: (1) improperly assessing regulatory
responsibility; (2) a financial inability to secure adequate management;
and (3) a lack of incentives to accurately report CWS violations.65
1. The SDWA on Paper
In 1974, Congress passed the SDWA, with a goal of “protect[ing]
public health.”66 In large part, the SDWA allows the EPA to set stan-
dards to ensure water quality.67 However, the SDWA merely places the
EPA into a role as an “administrator”68 and encourages states to step into
a day-to-day oversight role through what has become known as the Act’s
“state primacy” provision.69 This provision allows a state, after meeting
seven individual requirements, to obtain the “primary enforcement
responsibility” for its water systems.70 An applicant state must imple-
ment state water regulations that are “no less stringent” than the na-
tional standards set by the EPA71 and must implement procedures that
provide for the “enforcement of such state regulations” including moni-
toring and inspections.72
For the forty-nine states—including South Carolina73—that have
received this designation, responsibilities abound. These include: “mak[ing]
64 Id.
65 Id.




-6M7M] (last visited Mar. 10, 2021).
67 Id.
68 42 U.S.C. § 300(f)(7) (2018).
69 Id. § 300g-2; EPA, supra note 66.
70 42 U.S.C. § 300g-2(a) (2018).
71 Id. § 300g-2(a)(1).
72 Id. § 300g-2(a)(2).
73 EPA, supra note 66 (Wyoming and Washington, D.C. have yet to adopt primacy).
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sure water systems test for contaminants, review[ing] plans for water
system improvements, conduct[ing] on-site inspections and sanitary sur-
veys, provid[ing] training and technical assistance, and tak[ing] action
against water systems not meeting standards.”74
Critically, states must manage these obligations among towns,
cities, and other localities. Following a 1996 amendment to the SDWA,
the EPA began publishing guidelines which set forth the “minimum stan-
dards” required for the “operators” of community water systems to be
certified.75 Despite this provision, the term “operator”—seemingly referring
to an individual or department that maintains local control over a CWS—
is not defined elsewhere within the text of the SDWA. In some instances,
the meaning of this term has even been left for court evaluation, resulting
in sometimes surprising delegations of operator responsibility.76
While SDWA can be considered and praised as an example of
groundbreaking environmental regulation,77 its blunt handover of enforce-
ment responsibility to states and the ensuing array of ambiguities have
created both financial and enforcement problems that disproportionately
impact low-income areas, especially ones in rural regions. However, even
if Denmark leaders were properly informed of their duties as they relate to
primacy or the SDWA more generally, there remains two more basic finan-
cially sensitive challenges to compliance: management and reporting.
2. The SDWA’s Managemental Burden
The dire financial situation confronting communities like Denmark
results in a fundamental challenge. The costs associated with daily testing
and monitoring under the SDWA can themselves become a barrier to en-
forcement. States tasked with overseeing the SDWA through the primacy
provision have struggled to help local municipalities comply, with some
states assembling their own frameworks for subsidizing CWS operations.
Known as “SDWA Fees,” these schemes are generally designed to ensure
adherence to the SDWA on the local, CWS level, but many leave signifi-
cant gaps in compliance related to daily operations and monitoring.78
74 Id.
75 42 U.S.C. § 300g-8 (2018).
76 See, e.g., United States v. Ritz, 772 F. Supp. 2d 1017, 1022 (S.D. Ind. 2011) (holding that
owner-supervisor of resort and campground was an “operator” under the SDWA).
77 See, e.g., Richard Weinmeyer et al., The Safe Drinking Water Act of 1974 and Its Role
in Providing Access to Safe Drinking Water in the United States, 19 AMA J. ETHICS 1018,
1018 (2017) (heralding the SDWA as an “invaluable regulatory framework”).
78 See, e.g., S.C. DEP’T OF HEALTH & ENV’T CONTROL, SUMMARY OF SDWA FEE
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Under South Carolina’s regime, for example, CWS administrators must
pay fees of up to $28,000 per year to guarantee yearly testing by DHEC
but retain much of the daily administrative burden in operating a CWS.79
Under the SDWA fee system, CWS administrators also pass costs
along to customers. In South Carolina, costs associated with the SDWA
fee system are assessed on a “per-tap” basis and are tacked onto custom-
ers’ water bill.80 While these fees may appear trivial, their mere existence
is cause for concern. It is ludicrous that under the SDWA, municipalities
and taxpayers must hand over additional money for the fundamental
guarantee of drinking poison-free water.
SDWA fee programs in state-primacy provision states also present
a more practical problem for monitoring: a communicative disconnect be-
tween the local agencies tasked with CWS monitoring and the state agency
tasked with broader, CWS oversight. In South Carolina, SDWA fees
guarantee DHEC’s emergency oversight, with state authorities available
on a round-the-clock basis “in the event of a water quality crisis in the
state.”81 However, this designed ameliorative or assistance function on
the part of a state agency presupposes that CWS administrators on the
local, monitoring level are aware of violations within their systems—
much less willing to report known problems to the proper state authorities.
Indeed, this intended collaboration between local CWS adminis-
trators and state agencies under state primacy overlooks the harsh
economic realities that are inescapable in rural places like Denmark. It
is difficult to imagine that Denmark—home to CWS without adequate
training or instruction—is realistically capable of meeting the demands
of the SDWA. In addition to the array of barriers to discovering problems
at their outset, rural, low-income communities can face increased costs
when problems are eventually discovered.82 This dynamic in turn creates
a dangerous incentive not to report drinking water problems—a dynamic
that alone robs SDWA fee structures of their efficacy.
SERVICES—FISCAL YEAR 2020, 1 (2019); Safe Drinking Water Fee, MINN.DEP’T OF HEALTH,
https://www.health.state.mn.us/communities/environment/water/com/scf.html [https://
perma.cc/KD4N-BZDV] (last visited Mar. 10, 2021); CONN. DEP’T OF PUB. HEALTH, SAFE
DRINKING WATER PRIMACY SUMMARY (2019).
79 S.C. DEP’T OF HEALTH & ENV’T CONTROL, supra note 34, at 2–3 (noting Denmark’s
failure to adequately staff its CWS and conduct required training.)
80 S.C. DEP’T OF HEALTH & ENV’T CONTROL, FY 2020 SAFE DRINKING WATER ACT FEE
SCHEDULE (2019).
81 S.C. DEP’T OF HEALTH & ENV’T CONTROL, supra note 78.
82 Allaire et al., supra note 1, at 2083.
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3. The SDWA’s Reporting Burden
The multilayered nature SDWA’s enforcement responsibility under
state primacy provides a healthy habitat for confusion. Chiefly, this con-
fusion has been manifested as uncertainty over the funding responsibil-
ity for daily operations. However, an additional problem lurks: a financially
connected failure to adequately report violations. While in Denmark the
City maintained day-to-day control over the CWS and the State of South
Carolina and DHEC retained oversight ability,83 there appears to have
been little clarity over which entity was tasked with reporting violations.
Though Mayor Wright insists that Denmark was wholly reliant on DHEC’s
vaguely defined “expertise,”84 for enforcement and management, it is
unclear if Denmark City leaders were aware of their reporting obliga-
tions. Indeed, by blindly delegating responsibility through state primacy,
the SDWA has both created an air of uncertainty around reporting and
fatally placed the onus of reporting onto local CWS administrators.
Under the SDWA and its primacy provision, there are two primary
reporting requirements. First, the primacy option demands that partici-
pating states maintain a consistent schedule of reporting—states must
keep records and make reports of activities that relate to the promulgation
of state-level standards and ongoing enforcement.85 When a CWS within
a primacy state commits a violation that has “the potential to have serious
adverse effects on human health,” the CWS must provide notice within
twenty-four hours to the state, its own customers and the EPA.86 Second,
the SDWA requires a CWS to provide its customers with an annual
“consumer confidence report” that, along with other information, summa-
rizes the presence of any contaminants within the system, their health
risks, and steps taken by the CWS to eliminate the contamination.87
Despite these commands within the text of the SDWA, evidence
shows that overall, America’s CWSs are failing to meet these reporting
requirements.88 As recently as 2015, approximately 77 million Americans
consumed water from systems that were in serious and open violation of
83 S.C. DEP’T OF HEALTH & ENV’T CONTROL, supra note 34, at 6 (noting Denmark failed
in its responsibility to adequately hire and train current CWS employees).
84 Id.; Ganim, supra note 28.
85 42 U.S.C. § 300g-2(a)(1) (2018); id. § 300g-2(a)(2); id. § 300g-2(a)(3).
86 42 U.S.C. § 300g-3(c)(2)(C) (2018); id. § 300g-3(c)(2)(C)(I).
87 42 U.S.C. § 300g-3(c)(4)(A) (2018).
88 Jacey Fortin, America’s Tap Water: Too Much Contamination, Not Enough Reporting,
Study Finds, N.Y.TIMES (May 4, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/04/us/tapwater
-drinking-water-study.html [https://perma.cc/V2KW-MTUT].
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the SDWA.89 The growing tendency of CWSs to stray from the SDWA’s
baseline violation reporting requirements90 has alone worsened other
drinking water issues, with EPA audits finding a pattern of “widespread
underreporting of violations” that raises significant barriers to adequate
enforcement.91 If regulators—federal or state—are not made aware of
SDWA violations, there cannot be any corrective action. Addressing this
issue directly, the 2013 National Public Water Systems Compliance Report
indicates America’s water system “violation data [is] substantially incom-
plete,”92 a statement that is cause for serious concern given the necessity
of data for effective enforcement.
In short, states and CWS operators are not reporting violations—
even as these violations represent serious community health threats.
Notably, the mechanics of the SDWA’s forced relationship between local
CWS operators, state authorities, and the federal EPA have created what
has been described as a glorified “honor code” that allows serious prob-
lems to remain unaddressed and invisible in official records.93 Flint,
Michigan’s lead-tainted water crisis offers a grim illustration of this
system. While testing by third-party nonprofit groups infamously found
high levels of toxic lead in Flint’s water, the city’s water system officially
“had no reported violations” of the EPA and SDWA regulations.94
Within this so-called “honor code” of reporting, distressed rural
localities may be particularly incentivized to refrain from reporting
violations—an incentive that is tied to their financial reality.95 For states
that have been assigned “primary enforcement responsibility”96 under
the state-primacy mechanism, the SDWA commands state agencies to
“adopt authority for administrative penalties.”97 In systems that carry
water to a community of more than 10,000, for example, the provision
requires that states impose a penalty on the offending CWS that is “not
89 Id.
90 KRISTIPULLEN FEDINICK ET AL., NAT’LRES.DEF.COUNCIL,THREATS ON TAP:WIDESPREAD
VIOLATIONS HIGHLIGHT NEED FOR INVESTMENT IN WATER INFRASTRUCTURE AND PROTEC-
TIONS 7 (2017), https://www.nrdc.org/sites/default/files/threats-on-tap-water-infrastruc
ture-protections-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/R8EU-UL83].
91 Id.
92 EPA, 2013 NATIONAL PUBLIC WATER SYSTEMS COMPLIANCE REPORT, 3 (2013), https://
www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-06/documents/sdwacom2013.pdf [https://perma
.cc/6TVG-DWEA].
93 FEDINICK ET AL., supra note 90, at 7.
94 Id. at 6.
95 Allaire et al., supra note 1, at 2082–83; FEDINICK ET AL., supra note 90, at 7.
96 42 U.S.C. § 300g-2 (a) (2018).
97 Id. § 300g-2 (a)(6) (2018).
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less than $1,000 per day, per violation.”98 However, for CWSs that serve
smaller populations, such as Denmark’s and those of many of rural places,
the SDWA extends considerable leeway to states in assessing penalties—
proscribing that these systems be fined amounts that are “adequate to
ensure compliance.”99 Given mandated penalties for violations and the
statutory unknowns for the small CWSs that often serve rural communi-
ties, it is unsurprising that many CWSs—large and small—chronically
underreport SDWA violations.
Underreporting can include failing to internally document the
violation or, perhaps most seriously, failing to report the violation to the
EPA as required.100 A litany of “financial barriers to accurate violation
reporting and compliance”101 may mean that for states and CWS admin-
istrators who are in violation of SDWA provisions, remaining silent—
even if these violations threaten community health—may be the only
affordable option.
In combination, basic barriers to enforcement, a confusing patch-
work of responsibilities under the SDWA, and incentives to keep violations
quiet have left rural America’s drinking water safety in question. In South
Carolina, this conspicuous lack of interagency collaboration amid the chaos
and costs of SDWA enforcement would combine with an ineffective legal
response to create the Denmark Water Crisis.
III. BREAKDOWN AND FALLOUT IN DENMARK
Once the closure of Denmark’s Cox Mill well was announced in
August 2018,102 two disparate responses emerged: one emanating from
government and another emanating from the local community. However,
Denmark’s water struggles did not begin in 2018. Rather, the Denmark
Water Crisis is rooted in a lack of government response and communication
ten years prior to closure of the Cox Mill well.
Glaringly, both Denmark officials and South Carolina DHEC offi-
cials were aware in 2011 of HaloSan’s use at the Cox Mill well.103 Further
still, the DHEC report from that year expresses concern that those
98 Id. § 300g-2(a)(6)(A) (2018).
99 Id. § 300g-2(a)(6)(B) (2018).
100 Id. § 300g-3(c)(1)(A)(i–ii); FEDINICK ET AL., supra note 90, at 7.
101 Allaire at el., supra note 1, at 2082–83.
102 S.C. DEP’T OF HEALTH & ENV’T CONTROL, supra note 24, at 1.
103 See supra Section I.C.
2021] NOT APPROVED FOR HUMAN CONSUMPTION 895
tasked with administering HaloSan tablets to Denmark’s water system
had not received appropriate training.104 The 2011 report is damning when
placed within a chronology: it was published four years after the 2007
EPA decision on Halohydanatoins, in which the agency officially classi-
fied HaloSan-type compounds a pesticide unfit for human consumption
and advised heavy precautions even when using the chemicals in indus-
trial applications.105
Somehow, DHEC inspectors did not respond to an available, official
federal publication that explicitly cautioned against using HaloSan in
applications like CWS management. This egregious lack of basic inter-
agency communication and ensuing regulatory ignorance is cause for ex-
treme concern. While the SDWA’s state primacy provision expressly grants
states “primary enforcement responsibility,”106 Denmark’s use of HaloSan
indicates that it does little to foster communication channels between
states and the EPA regarding even the salient information for CWS opera-
tors: dangerous chemicals that should be avoided. Indeed, a background
failing of collaboration between local, state, and federal agencies has lurked
behind the Denmark Water Crisis at every stage and into the present.
A. Official Denials
Notably, people in Denmark believed there was something wrong
with their drinking water well before the Cox Mill well was officially closed.
Years of complaints about water quality and discoloration simply came
to head in early 2018.107 In January of that year, Dr. Marc Edwards, a
noted water quality expert involved with testing in Flint, Michigan and
Washington, D.C., offered to perform a series of bacterial tests on Den-
mark’s wells.108 After initially expressing a willingness for Edwards to
proceed, Mayor Wright reversed course and insisted that outside testing
was not needed and that he would not allow it to go forward.109 Implicitly
pointing to the structure of SDWA enforcement within South Carolina,
Mayor Wright boldly declared that having an outside entity conduct water
104 S.C. DEP’T OF HEALTH & ENV’T CONTROL, supra note 34, at 2.
105 See EPA, supra note 47, at 12–13.
106 42 U.S.C. § 300g-2(a) (2018).
107 Ganim, supra note 28.
108 Sammy Fretwell, Small town SC mayor won’t let Flint water crisis researcher test
wells for pollution, THE STATE (Jan. 24, 2018), https://www.thestate.com/news/local/arti
cle196354779.html [https://perma.cc/V8L7-HUWC].
109 Id.
896 WM. & MARY ENV’T L. & POL’Y REV. [Vol. 45:881
testing would be “an insult to DHEC” and would serve only as a vehicle
for unspecified “motivation[s].”110
Even after Denmark’s inexplicable use of HaloSan was finally
disclosed and the Cox Mill well was closed, Mayor Wright and other local
government leaders continued to speak from a position of defiance. In
November 2019, after the mandated closure of the Cox Mill well due to
HaloSan use, the levying of an additional $4,000 DHEC fine for Denmark’s
ongoing failure to address serious system-wide issues,111 and a visit from
2020 presidential candidate Bernie Sanders to distribute bottled water
in Denmark,112 Mayor Wright remained unwilling to admit any fault on
the part of Denmark city officials, saying flatly that Denmark had “never
distributed water that was unsafe.”113
Incredibly, Mayor Wright and Denmark officials have extended
their handling of Denmark’s HaloSan problems to the current, ongoing
problems faced by the water system. Despite continued complaints about
water quality,114 Denmark leaders have characterized an additional 2019
consent order related to inadequate contamination-control measures as
a normal “part of the process that ensures water quality is fine.”115 How-
ever, administrative action in the form of a consent order that documents
malfunctioning fire hydrants, inadequate backflow controls, and a lack of
system flushing should certainly not be considered a normative part of
the “process” to provide clean drinking water.116
B. Community Anger
While Mayor Wright, Denmark officials, and DHEC administrators
remain noncommittal at best in their handling of Denmark’s HaloSan
110 Id.
111 Gene Zaleski, Denmark facing $4,000 DHEC fine for not addressing water system




112 Bristow Marchant, Bernie Sanders campaign to hand out bottled water in Denmark
a week after SC visit, THECHARLOTTEOBSERVER(May 24, 2019), https://www.charlotteob
server.com/news/state/south-carolina/article230757269.html [https://perma.cc/LD4S-H38B].
113 Loren Thomas, Water concerns continue to plague the City of Denmark after contro-
versial chemical taken out of system, WLTX (Nov. 26, 2019), https://www.wltx.com/article
/news/city-of-denmark-to-upgrade-aging-water-system/101-d4ac140b-7439-44be-8f8f-933
54c015609 [https://perma.cc/7N7T-A54V].
114 Zaleski, supra note 111.
115 Id.
116 Id.
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misuse and continuing CWS issues, the people of Denmark continue to
exhibit a dogged determination in the fight for clean drinking water—
despite the apparent futility of their efforts. Of course, the ongoing legal
and political reckoning known as the Denmark Water Crisis would not
exist without the vigilance of Denmark’s citizens. At its core, the crisis
was brought to light by citizen pressure alone. It was continuous com-
plaints which led the DHEC to allow the fateful 2018 survey that revealed
the use of HaloSan.117 It was also a coalition of concerned Denmark resi-
dents that attempted to engage Dr. Marc Edwards in ongoing water
quality testing and has continued to exert pressure on Mayor Wright and
other officials.118
More substantively, the admirable perseverance of Denmark’s citi-
zens has been channeled into real legal and political action. Two separate
class action suits have been filed—and have so far been joined for the
purposes of discovery.119 One class of plaintiffs is represented by former
South Carolina House of Representatives member Bakari Sellers, who
has independently called for a statewide investigation into the Denmark
Water Crisis.120 In response to the class action suits, Denmark has contin-
ued to minimize the overall scope of the crisis, haphazardly alleging that
the eligible class of plaintiffs—that is, those who suffered harm—does not
include all people in Denmark who drank Denmark water.121
Though the ongoing actions appear stalled in settlement talks, an
alarming fact remains: two small class action suits are the only legally
significant responses to a large-scale public health event.122 Ironically,
the City of Denmark has in fact recently responded to ongoing commu-
nity concerns regarding the quality of Denmark’s water supply: by hiring
117 BUREAU OF WATER, S.C. DEP’T OF HEALTH & ENV’T CONTROL, supra note 41, at 5.
118 Ganim, supra note 28; Zaleski, supra note 111.
119 See Complaint at 1, James v. City of Denmark, No.2018-CP0500242 (2nd Cir. C.P. filed
Nov. 15, 2018); Consent Order to Consolidate Cases at 2, James v. City of Denmark,
Berry v. City of Denmark, No. 2018-CP0500242, 2018-CP0500244 (2nd Cir. C.P. filed
May 15, 2019); Ganim, supra note 28.
120 Dionne Gleaton, Lawmaker wants special committee to probe DHEC role of non-EPA




121 Def. Mot. to Reconsider Class Certification at 2–3, James v. City of Denmark, No.2018
-CP0500242 (2nd Cir. C.P. filed May 31, 2019).
122 See James v. City of Denmark, No.2018-CP0500242 (2nd Cir. C.P. ADR Action Jun. 6,
2019).
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a public relations firm.123 Continuing a pattern of Denmark leaders
attempting to plead ignorance despite clear evidence of HaloSan use,
Denmark city administrator Heyward Robinson suggested that the firm’s
services were necessary because “this small group of people have done a
lot of damage to Denmark’s reputation.”124
While Denmark leaders apparently struggle with the city’s abstract
“reputation,” its citizens continue to grapple with the very real problem
of not trusting their drinking water.125 Notably, in larger, more politically
connected cities like Flint, Michigan, water issues have been met with
sweeping declarations of emergency.126 In Flint specifically, a countywide
declaration of emergency was declared almost immediately after commu-
nity complaints and subsequent testing completed by Dr. Marc Edwards
revealed profound water toxicity.127 Quite differently in South Carolina,
the long-held concerns of Denmark residents were met with silent apathy
if not outright resentment.
Moreover, unlike in Flint and more visible locales, the community
and legal response to water issues in Denmark has been handicapped by
an absence of effective legal organizing frameworks and enforcement
mechanisms. Though citizens in Denmark have made a valiant effort
toward self-organization through groups like Denmark Citizens for Safe
Water (“DCSW”),128 a lack of overarching organizational support has left
the community solely dependent on the volatile platform of a Facebook
group page.129 Considering the profoundly limited scope of community in-
volvement and legal responses, the Denmark Water Crisis is cause for both
a new look at reforming the SDWA and a re-evaluation of the practice of
community lawyering within the context of rural, low-income communities.
123 Stephen Hobbs, A Year After a Controversial Chemical Discovery This SC City’s Water





126 P.Z. Ruckart et al., The Flint Water Crisis: A Coordinated Public Health Emergency
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128 Ron Baxley Jr., Denmark Citizens for Safe Water to Hold Rally, March in City on
Jan. 26, THE TIMES & DEMOCRAT (Jan. 18, 2019), https://thetandd.com/news/local/den
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14233a809f.html [https://perma.cc/6M7A-J33Z].
129 Den. Citizens for Safe Water, About, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/groups
/DenmarkCitizensforSafeWater/about/ [https://perma.cc/DQV9-FDEG].
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IV. REFORMING THE SDWA AND THE CALL FOR ENVIRONMENTAL
JUSTICE THROUGH COMMUNITY LAWYERING
A. Denmark and Reforming the SDWA
The ongoing crisis in Denmark is just one example of how the nearly
fifty-year-old set of regulations that make up the SDWA is failing to ad-
dress a distinctly low income and rural set of realities.130 While the SDWA’s
widely adopted state primacy provision may have been initially conceived
as a harmless and perhaps even cost-effective way of delegating enforce-
ment responsibility,131 the well-documented failures of South Carolina’s
DHEC and Denmark city officials certainly call the overall efficacy of the
provision into question.132 Even further, despite the clear command for
states to report violations and inform CWS customers,133 Denmark’s contin-
ued HaloSan use (despite FDA warnings)134 is an unfortunate example
of a national trend of serious violations within CWSs.135 Finally, while
Denmark has been issued consent orders,136 and the State of South Caro-
lina has faced fines related to Denmark’s water, it would be absurd to
assert that these “penalties” under the current SDWA have truly ensured
access to clean water by Denmark citizens.137
Notably, a compelling case for reforming the SDWA has already
been well-established—even outside the context of solely rural areas. In
the wake of the Flint Water Crisis, for example, experts have specifically
pointed out how the shortcomings of the SDWA’s current reporting and
notice structure “allow[ed] officials to shirk their responsibilities” in ad-
dressing Flint’s severe water problems.138 As in Denmark, people in Flint
were not informed of lead contamination in their water supply until well
after many city administrators were aware of the issue—leading to a
broad call for “revised timelines regarding notice to the public” under the
SDWA.139 Finally, in yet another unfortunate parallel to Denmark, lax
reporting and enforcement ambiguity under the SDWA allowed Flint
130 EPA, supra note 66.
131 42 U.S.C. § 300g-2 (2018); EPA, supra note 66.
132 See supra Sections I.B and III.A.
133 See supra Section II.A.2.
134 See supra Section I.C.
135 Fortin, supra note 88.
136 See supra Section I.B; supra Section III.A.
137 Id.
138 Sherwin, supra note 3, at 695.
139 Id. at 669.
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officials to ignore and deny grave drinking water deficiencies even in the
face of pressure from Flint citizens and the scientific community.140 How-
ever, despite analogous SDWA problems in Flint and Denmark, only the
Flint water crisis has led to a bare modicum of significant regulatory
repair—with proposed legislation to improve lead-contamination notifica-
tion.141 Seemingly, Denmark and other rural places grappling with clean
drinking water access are too unknown and perhaps too complicated to
garner the attention of reformers.
For places like small-town Denmark, the challenge of regulatory
problems and inadequate enforcement provisions under the current SDWA
is a uniquely threefold one. First, the SDWA’s current state primacy pro-
vision is simply inadequate to provide proper enforcement and monitoring
for cash-strapped, rural places. Second, once water problems arise, the
current SDWA does not sufficiently incentivize CWS administrators in
these communities to report and inform communities of violations. Third,
and most critically, the SDWA is currently without guaranteed remedial
measures that are tailored to the needs of rural, imperiled communities.
A move to reform the SDWA should seek to simultaneously address these
three concerns.
1. Alterations to the State Primacy Provision
First, in addressing the existing enforcement maze within the
SDWA, cities like Denmark and states like South Carolina would benefit
from an alternative conception of the state primacy provision. Currently,
as commentators have pointed out, the existing state primacy framework
presupposes “cooperative federalism” between federal, state, and local
actors.142 However, as the disconnect between the EPA and Denmark
regarding Halohydanatoins143 alone indicates, this idealized level of en-
forcement and monitoring collaboration has proven nonexistent in practice,
both in Denmark and nationwide.144
Instead, Congress should consider a new, more flexible conception
of the primacy provision—one rooted in already proposed changes and
one which recognizes the severe challenges to small towns in securing
effective oversight over their CWSs. This Note advocates an approach
140 Id. at 696.
141 Id.
142 Id. at 711.
143 See supra Section I.C.
144 Id.; see also supra Section II.A.2; supra Section I.B.
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inspired by a proposal put forward by environmental health expert David
Dana: assigning all responsibility and ongoing management to state agen-
cies exclusively, rather than allowing individual municipalities to supervise
their respective CWS.145 In practice, this would involve states taking on
the duties of testing drinking water, completing required treatment proce-
dures, and informing citizens when problems within the CWS arise.146 As
Dana has pointed out, simplifying state primacy by restricting it to states,
rather than municipalities, could have a beneficial, secondary effect: there
may be an increased awareness of drinking water issues on the part of
newly involved state-level politicians.147
Departing from the approach advocated by Dana, however, a more
moderate change to the SDWA may be more appropriate, albeit one still in-
formed by a recognition of the need for increased state control. Instead of
default state oversight, which Dana concedes may cause some state legisla-
tures “to flinch” in response to such a “radical option,” states should, under
a reformed SDWA, only have automatic oversight over CWS administration
for municipalities which fall under a predetermined population threshold.148
Under this regime, a small community like Denmark would in-
deed automatically have its CWS wholly administered by the State of
South Carolina. Such a change could alone eliminate the well-documented
training and staffing problems experienced by small municipalities like
Denmark.149 SDWA fees would largely be unnecessary and thus the
confusion regarding their impact on responsibility could be alleviated.
Moreover, this scheme would replace current enforcement confusion with
“a defined system, requiring action and accountability by specific [state]
agencies.”150 A more well “defined system” overseen by a larger entity
(i.e., a state) may prevent a dangerous chemical like HaloSan from ever
being introduced into a CWS merely because a small-town CWS adminis-
trator “think[s]” it is approved.151
This path of reform is also appealing on a pragmatic level. Includ-
ing a mandate within the SDWA that state-level agencies have increased
and, in the case of small communities, exclusive control over CWSs would
145 See David Dana, Escaping the Abdication Trap When Cooperative Federalism Fails:
Legal Reform After Flint, 44 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1329, 1350 (2017).
146 Id.
147 Id. at 1351.
148 Id. at 1350.
149 Allaire et al., supra note 1, at 2082; see S.C. DEP’T OF HEALTH & ENV’T CONTROL, supra
note 34, at 6.
150 Sherwin, supra note 3, at 711.
151 Ganim, supra note 28.
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help to alleviate a more basic issue faced by rural places: money.152 Criti-
cally, Denmark fits into a nationwide pattern of rural, low-income com-
munities struggling with regulatory compliance due to “limited financial
resources and technical expertise.”153
The resource gap for places like Denmark is staggering and has
a profound effect on the ability of similar communities to adhere to the
commands of the SDWA. For example, a report from the Government
Office of Accountability found that training, funding, and staffing issues—
each directly linked to financial status—are the three primary contributors
to inadequate compliance under the SDWA.154 Under a system that placed
the burdens of paying employees, coordinating training programs, and
generally providing for the continued management of a CWS on the State
of South Carolina rather than on a low-income community of 3,500, the
people of Denmark would have their drinking water protected by an
entity that can actually afford to protect it.155
2. Information for All
Apart from the inherent issues presented by the SDWA’s existing
state-primacy provision, an even more basic failing has continued to be
at issue in both Denmark and elsewhere: information access. In Denmark,
it was precisely a level of terrifying confusion surrounding the safety of
the town’s water supply that resulted in an anxiety that lingers into the
present.156 The inaccessibility of information and lack of meaningful
public notice mechanisms has also been highlighted as a broader failure
of the current SDWA nationwide, including in Flint.157 Though in South
Carolina the DHEC has created a centralized website which documents
Denmark’s water quality, the information is almost totally backward look-
ing, relating primarily to events from 2011 to 2017.158 Thus, this attempt
at providing notice fails to address the most basic drinking water question
of all: is the water safe to drink today?
152 Allaire et al., supra note 1, at 2082.
153 Id.
154 U.S.GOV’TACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-11-381, Drinking Water: Unreliable State Data
Limit EPA’s Ability to Target Enforcement Priorities and Communicate Water Systems
Performance, 20 (2011).
155 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 13.
156 See Ganim, supra note 28; Hobbs, supra note 123.
157 Sherwin, supra note 3, at 711.
158 See Denmark Public Water System, S.C. DEP’T OF HEALTH & ENV’T CONTROL, https://
www.scdhec.gov/environment/your-water-coast/denmark-public-water-system [https://
perma.cc/B697-4RV4] (last visited Mar. 10, 2021) (website landing page contains download-
able fact sheets and archival records).
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An amendment to the SDWA could easily address this shortcom-
ing—namely one that takes into the account the view that a properly
informed public “should be a fundamental consideration” when govern-
ments are responding to concerns about water quality.159 In practice,
such an amendment would require states operating under the SDWA’s
state primacy provision to develop an easy to use, centralized web plat-
form to display water quality data. Ideally, data would be updated daily—a
requirement that may itself lead to improved drinking water quality as
states would be forced to become even more vigilant through the requi-
site technology that would make such monitoring possible. Of course, as
a practical consideration, this amendment would need to take into con-
sideration the alarming fact that nearly a quarter of rural Americans
report significant barriers to internet access.160 To address this concern,
any such amendment should include language requiring duplicate informa-
tion presented on a toll-free telephone line.
The style of this updated and accurate water-quality web platform
could borrow from an approach used to simplify another complicated area
of federal regulation: the tax code. Surprisingly, the current Internal Reve-
nue Service website is easy to navigate, offering topic area tabs, download-
able forms, and informational videos.161 As one tax law expert has pointed
out, IRS materials, including its web services, are specifically designed
to accomplish the difficult goal of accurately displaying tax law in an “un-
derstandable and easy-to-read manner.”162 Moreover, it is specifically the
web-component of IRS information and its subsequent search-ability
which has allowed “large numbers of stakeholders” to receive necessary
tax information.163 It is more than a little remarkable that accessing
information about the tax code may be easier than discovering whether
your child’s bathwater is contaminated. An SDWA web platform that is
tailored to individual communities and one which uses the most up-to-
date data possible could help close this gap.
159 Sherwin, supra note 3, at 696.
160 Monica Anderson, About a Quarter of Rural Americans Say Access to High-Speed
Internet Is a Major Problem, PEW RSCH. CTR.: FACT TANK (Sept. 10, 2018), https://www
.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/09/10/about-a-quarter-of-rural-americans-say-access-to
-high-speed-internet-is-a-major-problem/ [https://perma.cc/EPX9-76BJ].
161 See U.S.INTERNAL REVENUESERV., https://www.irs.gov/ [https://perma.cc/TJ2P-S72M]
(last visited Mar. 10, 2021) (IRS home page features several menus and links).
162 Andrea Monroe, Hidden in Plain Sight: IRS Publications and a New Path to Tax Reform,
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While an SDWA amendment requiring increased access and more
granular data would undoubtedly improve confidence in water quality in
places like Denmark, it may also help address two secondary concerns:
internal confusion and reporting. In Denmark, for example, city leaders
repeatedly denied the existence of problems with the city’s water because
the bird’s-eye, yearly reports from the DHEC suggested the system was
operating normally.164 Unfortunately, blind adherence to data, regardless
of its accuracy or expiration date, was also seen in Flint, with “county
officials blaming the City of Flint for not providing them with information”
that accurately represented the current conditions of the water system.165
In contrast, a constantly running, constantly updated web or phone-line
platform would offer irrefutable evidence of an ongoing problem.
In addition, if the baseline amount of water quality information
was made more accessible and the SDWA’s state primacy provision was
shifted to place a lesser burden on small communities, the glorified “honor
code” of violation reporting may disappear.166 In short, because states,
rather than local municipalities, would be tasked with SDWA compliance
and reporting, places like Denmark would no longer be forced to weigh
their duty to report against their inability to pay the penalty.167
3. Mandated Emergency Measures
Finally, the overall experience of Denmark citizens in confronting
issues with their drinking water is cause for a radical re-evaluation of
how the SDWA handles large-scale water crises. Shockingly, even after
Denmark’s use of HaloSan was revealed and water problems continued
to persist, city residents received little in the way of government assis-
tance.168 Instead, the people of Denmark were forced to turn to charity
drives at baseball stadiums;169 donations from self-organized community
groups;170 and perhaps most incredibly, a bulk bottled water donation
from 2020 presidential candidate Bernie Sanders.171 Effectively, despite
164 Ganim, supra note 28.
165 Sherwin, supra note 3, at 663.
166 FEDINICK ET AL., supra note 90, at 7.
167 See supra Section II.A.2.
168 Zaleski, supra note 111.
169 Sammy Fretwell, Denmark’s water woes spark charity drive at Columbia ballpark,
CHARLOTTE OBSERVER(Feb. 4, 2019), https://www.charlotteobserver.com/news/state/south
-carolina/article225498560.html [https://perma.cc/6N4Y-K7SL].
170 Hobbs, supra note 123.
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the laudable promises of the SDWA, people in Denmark were left to fend
for themselves.
The lack of federal or state response is both troubling and ulti-
mately unsurprising given the web of confusion presented by the SDWA’s
current state primacy structure.172 However, the lack of concrete assis-
tance highlights the third and perhaps most basic unanswered question
under the current SDWA: what really happens when things go wrong?
While the SDWA currently mandates penalties for various violations, it
does little in the way of providing an established path for states and mu-
nicipalities to address the needs of those whom the SDWA was most in-
tended to protect, people and families that rely on clean drinking water.173
Into this void, formally adopting the language and approach of two distinct
responses to drinking water issues may offer a useful path forward.
First, in the wake of drinking water issues in Michigan, advocates
have pursued constitutional claims, arguing that violations of the SDWA
that result in the unknowing ingestion of tainted water represent a
violation of subsequent due process and equal protection.174 Second, in
response to the nationwide problem of drinking water safety, advocates
have pushed for the passage of legislation that would grant specific
communities guaranteed financial and infrastructure reparations after
an environmental crisis occurs.175
In Boler v. Earley, a recent challenge arising out of the Flint
Water crisis, plaintiffs alleged (among other claims) that the violations
of the SDWA which occurred in Flint (1) violated Substantive Due Pro-
cess through both state created danger and an invasion of the right to
bodily integrity and (2) violated the Equal Protection Clause through
wealth-based discrimination.176 To the surprise of many, the Sixth Circuit
was not entirely dismissive of these claims, making a threshold finding that
they were not precluded by the SDWA itself.177 While its final dispensa-
tion is uncertain, Boler has broadly demonstrated that Due Process and
TIMES&DEMOCRAT (May 23, 2019), https://thetandd.com/news/local/sanders-campaign-do
nating-water-rally-planned-in-denmark/article_cf024317-4756-5ef2-8e5d-74125eac110b
.html [https://perma.cc/AQ39-S4M7].
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Equal Protection language may offer “a legal foothold” for improving the
framework of the SDWA.178
Apart from constitutional claims, advocates have also forwarded
a notion of community reparations in response to violations of environ-
mental laws. One suggested model involves a reparation scheme that
includes a consideration of community health and infrastructure needs.179
Under this framework, communities that have experienced some form of
environmental trauma would be given “health-related assistance” to
address “exposure and latent effects.”180 In addition, advocates of this
framework have called for the issuance of “community-based funds” that
would go toward improving the resilience of communities that may be
currently without “adequate environmental testing.”181
An amendment to the SDWA that codified these two initiatives
into the text of the Act would significantly improve the adherence of the
SDWA to its guiding goal: securing America’s health by “regulating the
nation’s public drinking supply.”182 First, amending the SDWA to include
language related to bodily integrity, state created danger, and income-
related issues would have a profound symbolic effect, reminding all con-
fronting the Act of its connection to basic human survival. Moreover, once
drinking water crises do arise, the inclusion of this or similar affirmative,
rights-based language with the SDWA could help to bolster claims put
forth by communities like Denmark as they seek to challenge the failures
of CWS administrators in court.
Secondly, amending the SDWA to include a firmly prescribed
pathway of community assistance—rather than just penalties assessed
on administrators—would both closely adhere to the goals of the SDWA
and more broadly ensure that all Americans are guaranteed drinking
water that is not only safe, but worry free. Under such an amendment,
the people of Denmark would likely not have had to resort to the unbe-
lievable remedy of self-help when their trusted leaders repeatedly failed to
adhere to the SDWA’s commands. Instead, an SDWA that included a provi-
sion for “community-based reparation” would offer places like Denmark
a comprehensive plan to address both health and infrastructure concerns
once SDWA violations occur.183
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180 Id.
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B. Community Lawyering, Environmental Justice, and Denmark
Obtaining improved access to clean water for low-income, rural
communities—much less amending the SDWA—will require significant
changes in the positioning of legal advocates, both in the courtroom and
the community. Currently, as the seemingly endless situation in Den-
mark shows, there does not appear to be a broad consensus about the most
effective way for communities to obtain better environmental outcomes
or what the most effective organizational tools are for lawyers and com-
munities in need.
Despite the size and scope of the Denmark Water Crisis, there have
been only two state-level legal actions.184 Additionally, as 2020 progresses,
a unified, empowered movement has yet to emerge from the Denmark
community.185 The solution to the current stalemate may lie in a twofold
approach: (1) a renewed attention to environmental justice and (2) a brand
of specifically rural, low-income community lawyering.
1. Environmental Justice in Denmark and Beyond
At its core, environmental justice refers to the consideration of
“disproportionate environmental impacts on communities of color [and]
low-income communities.”186 In practice, environmental justice also
encompasses a holistic advocacy philosophy and orientation—as lawyers
within the movement seek to assist communities to overcome barriers
related to race, class, or other sources of discrimination.187 The work of
Earthjustice, a nonprofit legal organization focused on environmental
issues, offers a useful example of environmental justice in practice.188 In
a rural, low-income area of Louisiana known as “Cancer Alley” due to the
prevalence of cancer and a surrounding landscape of petrochemical plants,
lawyers from Earthjustice worked to turn anger into action.189 There,
184 See Complaint, James v. City of Denmark, No.2018-CP0500242 (2nd Cir. C.P. filed
Nov. 15, 2018); Consent Order to Consolidate Cases, James v. City of Denmark, Berry v. City
of Denmark, No. 2018-CP0500242, 2018-CP0500244 (2nd Cir. C.P. filed May 15, 2019).
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Statutes: A New Look At Federal Policies and Civil Rights Protections And California’s
Recent Initiatives, HASTINGS W.NW. J. ENV’T L. & POL’Y 41, 42 (2013).
187 Id. at 42.
188 About Us, EARTHJUSTICE, https://earthjustice.org/about [https://perma.cc/W4Q4-QKQ6]
(last visited Mar. 10, 2021).
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lawyers and advocates chose to interpret community’s struggle not as an
isolated example of tort harm, but instead as part of a larger, “pernicious
threat to the health” of a community that is inseparable from its demo-
graphic makeup.190
Applied to Denmark, lawyers and advocates could similarly use
the principles of environmental justice to do more than just challenge the
actions of the DHEC and Denmark CWS administrators in court. Rather,
practitioners could take part in a dialogue with Denmark city leaders,
DHEC administrators, and South Carolina politicians that considers
Denmark’s unique demographic quality.191 Much like communities within
“Cancer Alley,” it is precisely Denmark’s status as a low-income community
that has resulted in placing its CWS in a perilous position.192 Of course,
to effectuate this underlying goal of environmental justice, advocates must
consider their relationship to the community at large.
2. Community Lawyering
In Denmark and in rural places nationwide, making meaningful
inroads towards either securing SDWA reform or broader environmental
justice will be impossible without an improved community network.
Indeed, providing a platform for impactful community organizing is the
mission of what has become known as community lawyering. Community
lawyering posits that the role of the lawyer is “expansive” and is reliant
on an intimate knowledge of the community and is grounded in a cohe-
sive “theory of action.”193 It is the theoretical component that positions
effective community lawyers as advocates for improving the both the
“physical and social environment” of the community.194
To be effective within the movement of environmental justice,
community lawyering also involves a careful consideration of the power
dynamic between lawyer and community. Proponents of the community
lawyering approach have noted that an impactful relationship requires the
awareness that “affected communities do actually know what is best.”195
190 Id.
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193 Michael Diamond, Community Lawyering: Introductory Thoughts on Theory and
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Thus, rather than operate from outside the community, community lawyers
should consciously seek to avoid reinforcing an imbalanced power dy-
namic.196 For lawyers seeking to assist rural communities, this concern is
particularly important. Given rural America’s current lawyer shortage,
there may be an inherent level of unfamiliarity between the legal commu-
nity and the “distinctly vulnerable population” within rural communities.197
Because rural communities suffer disproportionately from the symptoms
of injustice and a lack of access to advocacy,198 rural community lawyer-
ing demands that lawyers operate with a specifically rural cultural com-
petency.199 In short, rural community lawyers must meet communities
where they are.
Applied to Denmark and the rural fight for clean drinking water
nationwide, effective community lawyering would utilize the field’s best
practices to develop broad community movements. Community lawyers
could assist in communities like Denmark—much like Earthjustice lawyers
in Cancer Alley—to transmute righteous community anger into activism.200
In Denmark, for example, this approach would call for lawyers to hold
information sessions to discuss the health risks of HaloSan; engage di-
rectly with Denmark city leaders at town meetings; and most importantly,
be responsive to Denmark residents. Whereas the Denmark Water Crises
has thus far only generated a blip of advocacy,201 rurally oriented commu-
nity lawyering could be the first step to forming a “critical consciousness”
around the environment, community health, and the SDWA.202
CONCLUSION
The purpose of the SDWA is admirably simple: to protect public
health.203 With the arrival of 2020, however, it will soon be two years since
initial closure of Denmark’s Cox Mill well and the subsequent discovery
that Denmark’s residents were not included with the SDWA’s promise.
Since then, further failures of enforcement and emergency management
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910 WM. & MARY ENV’T L. & POL’Y REV. [Vol. 45:881
on the part of officials has the exposed the dysfunction built into the na-
tion’s regulation of drinking water. While the SDWA remains a laudable
example of public-positive federal legislation, the Denmark Water Crisis
demonstrates the need for changes that tackle the unique challenges
facing low-income, rural America in the fight for clean drinking water.
Without the courageous response of Denmark residents, the scope
of Denmark’s HaloSan use and the city’s level of mismanagement would
have remained concealed. Still, the feeble response of government offi-
cials and the relative silence of the SDWA has left Denmark’s residents
without viable options for securing drinking water that is free from anxiety.
Instead, ensuring adequate enforcement, preventing future violations,
and broadly amending the SDWA will require a cohesive movement, one
built on community engagement. Therefore, the crisis in Denmark and
other, similar drinking water problems in rural America present lawyers
with a unique opportunity to pair the goals of environmental justice with
the tools of community lawyering. Under this approach, people in Denmark
and other rural communities can rely on—rather than fear—water from
a trusted source: their taps.
